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Justice Scalia: Affirmative or Negative?
Stephen M. Griffin

†

My focus in this essay is on Justice Scalia’s distinctive
1
contributions to constitutional theory, especially the theory of
constitutional interpretation. It could be said that in terms of
words on the page, Justice Scalia wrote relatively little on
constitutional theory, especially in comparison to Judge Robert
2
Bork, someone who Justice Scalia was often compared with in
the 1980s. Yet there is no doubt that Scalia’s writings were
enormously influential, especially with respect to his advocacy
3
of the version of originalism known as original public meaning.
In understanding Scalia’s approach to constitutional
theory, I suggest we should take inspiration from a key
formative experience he had in college as detailed in Bruce
4
Allen Murphy’s lengthy, well-researched biography. Murphy’s
† W.R. Irby Chair and Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in
Constitutional Law, Tulane Law School. Copyright © 2016 by Stephen M.
Griffin. Email: sgriffin@tulane.edu.
1. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); Antonin Scalia, Address Before the
Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986) in
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING
JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK, 101 (1987) [hereinafter Scalia, Address];
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts]; Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia,
Originalism]; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989).
2. There is no real counterpart in Scalia’s writings to Bork’s lengthy
treatment of themes in constitutional theory. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990);
ROBERT H. BORK, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
3. Scalia’s influence is attested to by two recent biographies that I will be
drawing on in this essay. JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND
CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA (2009); BRUCE
ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE (2014).
4. See MURPHY, supra note 3.
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book, which is indeed somewhat one-sided to Scalia’s
5
detriment, was not well received by certain legal academics,
but it struck me that this critical reaction ignored some
valuable insights Murphy carefully developed over the course of
reviewing nearly the entirety of Scalia’s life.
Consider Scalia’s pugnacious argumentative style, one of
his widely acknowledged traits. As Murphy recounts, in 2011
Linda Greenhouse raised the “puzzle” of Scalia repeatedly
savaging his fellow Justices in his opinions to little effect,
saying she couldn’t “think of an example of one of Justice
Scalia’s bomb-throwing opinions ever enticing a wavering
6
colleague to come over to his corner.” She wondered, “what
does this smart, rhetorically gifted man think his bullying
7
accomplishes?” For his part, while of course Scalia did not see
himself as a bully, he readily admitted that he loved to engage
8
in disputation simply for the sake of argument.
Greenhouse might be less puzzled after reading the part of
Murphy’s biography that describes Scalia’s exceptional success
9
as an intercollegiate debater. As a member of the top team
fielded by Georgetown’s justly famous Philodemic Society in the
early 1950s, Scalia participated in competitive policy debate,
sometimes known as “NDT” debate after the National Debate
Tournament that ends the year. I have some familiarity with
this sort of debate, having participated in it (albeit two decades
10
after Scalia) for four years at the University of Kansas.
The sort of debate in which Scalia and I participated is
basically an intellectual team competition centered around a
policy resolution whose merits are debated all year long. Each
5. See, e.g., Justin Driver, How Scalia’s Beliefs Completely Changed the
Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 9, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/
article/119360/scalia-court-one-reviewed-justin-driver; Steven G. Calabresi &
Justin Braga, The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Response to
Professor Bruce Allen Murphy and Professor Justin Driver (Feb. 24, 2015)
(unpublished book review), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2569336.
6. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 433 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Justice
Scalia Objects, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes
.com/2011/03/09/justice-scalia-objects/).
7. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 433.
8. Id. at 374.
9. Id. at 22–27.
10. I am pleased to identify some influential legal academics who were
also exceptional NDT debaters, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. They
include Laurence Tribe, Stewart Jay, Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawrence Solum,
and Frank B. Cross. I am sure there are other examples!
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team must be prepared to advocate both on the “Affirmative”
side of the resolution by proposing a specific plan of action and
the “Negative” side, criticizing in detail whatever plan the
other team defends. All debates at tournaments, whether they
are preliminary or elimination rounds, are scored by judges.
Success in competitive debate depends on skillful advocacy
and in-depth research, which often leads to an appreciation of
arcane policy details. The resolutions I debated were quite
general, allowing for a multitude of possible Affirmative plans.
We became familiar with nuclear war targeting strategy and
the possibility of global climate change years before such ideas
became common currency. The overarching purpose of debate is
education in the art of rhetoric or persuasive argument. This is
a purpose that Scalia, who already possessed an excellent
classical education before college, no doubt understood quite
well.
The kind of talent Scalia displayed and his extraordinary
success in competitive debate has its downside. Debaters can
fall into the trap of supposing that the “take no prisoners”
techniques that spell success in debate tournaments will
transfer readily to other contexts. Scalia’s obvious enthusiasm
for argument for its own sake plausibly led him to make this
11
assumption. I think we can profitably use this hypothesis to
analyze some of Scalia’s well-known theoretical moves.
One valuable point Murphy hits on is that the key to
winning debate rounds is not simply to use good arguments to
win once or twice, but to systematically develop and advance
12
the “unanswerable argument.” How does one do this? One
available pathway is to deploy preemptive arguments. In
debate, a preemptive argument is one structured to answer (or
avoid) the most likely objections before they are made. Once the
opposing team duly makes the obvious objection, they can be
13
made to look foolish in rebuttal.
Justice Scalia consistently resorted to preemptive
arguments in making his most well-known contributions to
constitutional theory. That is, he sought to occupy the
argumentative terrain in such a way so that counter11. See BISKUPIC, supra note 3, at 303–05.
12. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 23.
13. I should make it clear that I am not objecting to preemptive
arguments as such. Rather, I am arguing that Justice Scalia used preemptive
arguments in ways that worked to hinder the progress of constitutional
theory.
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arguments could not get off the ground. Before I discuss some
examples, we should observe that one alternative to making
preemptive arguments is to genuinely engage with opposing
points of view. Scalia never showed much interest in following
John Stuart Mill’s admonition that in addressing the
controversies of the day, one should always attempt to refute
14
the strongest possible version of the opposing position. By the
way, Mill’s advice is most assuredly not followed in
intercollegiate debate. In assessing Scalia, we should keep in
mind that debate is a competitive activity and debaters are not
in the habit of helping their opponents.
Scalia’s advocacy of originalism as original public meaning,
which was novel at the time, is an excellent example of the use
of preemptive argument. As Murphy describes, when Scalia
presented the idea of original public meaning in a 1986 speech,
15
he did not specify how this interpretive method worked. He
rather used the logical possibility of original public meaning to
occupy the argumentative terrain in a way that highlighted the
deficiencies of original intent as an alternative. Originalism
understood as original intent was under heavy attack in the
16
1980s by respected legal academics. Scalia used the idea of
original meaning to shift the argumentative ground given the
widely acknowledged difficulties of determining the collective
intent of the framers of the Constitution.
From a college debate perspective, we might say that
Scalia was using a preemptive argument in the negative.
Scalia’s 1986 speech was more about pointing out the flaws in
the opposing perspective than in advancing an affirmative case.
The somewhat-overdrawn contrast Scalia presented was
between approaches to interpretation that relied on publicly
verifiable evidence of constitutional meaning versus approaches
that invoked, as Scalia put it, “what the Framers might
17
secretly have intended.”
The contrast was questionable for reasons constitutional
scholars already appreciated at the time Scalia presented his
ideas. Arguing in 1988 for the original intent approach, for
example, respected constitutional scholar Richard Kay provided
14. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 98–99 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
1974).
15. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 125–26.
16. See, e.g., INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
17. Scalia, Address, supra note 1, at 103.
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some reasons why there was little real difference between
original meaning and original intent:
As a practical matter, an approach which relies on ordinary meanings
will usually result in the same interpretation that would follow from
original intentions adjudication. We expect the constitution-makers to
use words according to ordinary usage at the time of enactment. The
best evidence of the enactors’ intent is the language they used.
Indeed, in many cases, any other conclusion is so unlikely that an
explicit reference to extrinsic evidence of intent is unnecessary.
Certainly, when most readers agree that a particular clause or phrase
means one thing, the burden of persuasion ought to be on the
advocate of some other meaning. Such a presumption is fully
consistent with original intentions adjudication and a convenient rule
18
of administration.

So Scalia was exaggerating a bit by stressing the “secret”
nature of the framers’ deliberations at Philadelphia. To be sure,
as Scalia noted, the content of Madison’s notes of the
19
Philadelphia Convention was not known until 1840. Yet it is
also unlikely that the framers used one set of meanings for the
words in the Constitution at Philadelphia and then substituted
another during the ratification debates. The framers could rely
on their Philadelphia deliberations being secret, but they also
knew they would have to defend their handiwork openly. After
all, their signatures were on the document. This meant that it
was likely any problems with discovering the original intent of
the framers did not flow from the secret character of the
Philadelphia deliberations and thus would transfer over to the
quest for original public meaning. Yet Scalia, using preemptive
argument to shift the focus of the debate, made it appear
through the artful use of rhetoric that the two approaches were
sharply different.
To my knowledge, no one has ever followed up in a
systematic way to determine whether there were positions
taken on constitutional meaning at Philadelphia that were
different from the positions defended by framers during the
ratification debates. We should also keep in mind that when
Scalia began his career, everyone—liberals and conservatives
alike—resorted to the use of eighteenth-century historical

18. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 234–35
(1988) (citations omitted).
19. Scalia, Address, supra note 1, at 104.
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20

evidence in constitutional argument. In the 1970s and after,
for example, liberals used such evidence to show that Congress
had the exclusive power to decide for war and to defend the
active use of judicial review to protect individual rights. As I
will discuss below, this bears on Scalia’s characteristic
contention that the choice is between originalism and
nonoriginalism, not different takes on what the historical
evidence shows.
Indeed, when push came to shove, no one was interested in
21
abandoning the evidence we inherited from Philadelphia.
Evidence from the deliberations at the Federal Convention is
probative of constitutional meaning on multiple grounds. We
respect and use this evidence because the framers themselves
considered it to be relevant, because of what Michael Dorf has
termed their “heroic” authority, and given that they argued
over and indeed changed the wording of the Constitution
during their deliberations, their handiwork shows its design
22
and purpose. Also worth mentioning here is the considerable
insight, advanced by the eminent historian Jack Rakove, that
at the insistence of the Federalists, state ratifiers could not
condition ratification on making alterations to the Constitution.
This meant that in the end, the vote taken at the ratification
conventions was up or down on the whole document as opposed
to working through it clause by clause in the light of proposed
23
alternative phrasings. This made the ratification conventions
less useful as an authoritative source of constitutional
meaning.
The distinction Scalia promoted between original public
meaning and original intent was thus more apparent than real.
Nevertheless, his acolytes were inspired by the notion of a “new
24
originalism” and rebooted it on this basis. I believe this had

20. For a systematic study of the use of originalism by the Supreme
Court, including the Warren Court era, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED
PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013).
21. See, e.g., Scalia, Originalism, supra note 1, at 858. As Scalia noted in
this lecture, evidence from the founding period must be used carefully. Id. at
856. For a highly significant reminder of this truth, see MARY SARAH BILDER,
MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015).
22. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1800–16 (1997).
23. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 107–30 (1996).
24. See Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1185.
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an unfortunate impact on constitutional theory, a point I will
turn to shortly. For now, I would like to provide another
important instance of Scalia’s use of preemptive argument.
In one of his best known lectures, “Originalism: The Lesser
Evil,” Scalia went on the offensive, making an affirmative case
for the original public meaning approach and arguing that it
was superior to the competing approach to constitutional
25
interpretation.
Here Scalia’s preemptive move was to
nominate “nonoriginalism” as the alternative to original public
meaning. As Scalia saw it, nonoriginalism was the rejection of
original meaning in favor of using contemporary social meaning
26
to interpret the Constitution. For Scalia, nonoriginalism was
27
barely comprehensible. It was clearly illegitimate because, by
definition, it threw out the law of the Constitution in favor of
28
the evolving mores of contemporary society.
Scalia’s nonoriginalism was always a straw man, not the
least because it was based on a series of misleading
comparisons. In his lecture Scalia discussed how to resolve the
issue of the President’s power to remove executive officers by
29
using the method of original meaning. He contrasted original
meaning to some exceedingly general statements made by the
constitutional scholars he called nonoriginalist to the effect
that the Constitution invites us to make it relevant for today by
30
using contemporary social values. By and large, these scholars
were concerned with the exceedingly difficult interpretive
problems posed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, not
the more specific question of the removal power. Another
problem was that Scalia compared the use of originalism in a
leading Supreme Court opinion on the removal issue, Myers v.
31
United States,
with the pronouncements of scholars
addressing some of the most abstract issues in constitutional
law and theory. A fairer test would have been to contrast the
reasoning of Myers with an equally influential nonoriginalist
32
opinion, say, Brown v. Board of Education.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Scalia, Originalism, supra note 1.
See id. at 852–56; Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 1, at 38.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 89.
Scalia, Originalism, supra note 1, at 854–55.
Id. at 856–61.
Id. at 853–54.
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Having provided two examples of Scalia’s use of
preemptive argument, I will now move to a discussion of why I
believe this rhetorical strategy had a deleterious influence on
the progress of constitutional theory. As I have suggested,
Scalia’s first move from original intent to original meaning had
the desired effect of rebooting the debate—but without much
attention to whether the inquiry into original meaning was
substantially different from original intent. The reason both
methods were similar is that they both relied on historical
evidence as a source of legal authority. This meant they were
both equally vulnerable to critiques by historians launched at
almost exactly the same moment Scalia introduced the idea of
original meaning. Scalia’s biographer Murphy draws
appropriate attention to the historians’ critique throughout his
account of Scalia’s rise to prominence as a leader of the
33
conservative legal movement.
Scalia’s shift to original meaning had a noticeable and
unfortunate influence on debates over executive power in the
34
1990s and after. Under the theory of original public meaning,
the task of interpreting Article II involves determining the
“original” and “public” meaning of terms like “executive power.”
How did legal scholars carry out this project? In general, they
looked for evidence concerning the semantic meaning
“executive power” had for the public that read the Constitution,
perhaps using a reasonable eighteenth-century person
standard. I put these terms in scare quotes because the public
that existed in 1787–88 as the Constitution was debated and
ratified was not necessarily the same public that existed in the
American colonies of the seventeenth or mid-eighteenth
century. Nonetheless, executive power scholars inspired by
Scalia began with those earlier periods. This is partly because
they saw Locke’s writings on government and Blackstone’s
circa-1760s treatise as providing reliable evidence of the
original public meaning of executive power. These scholars
then tended to use a presumption that this meaning carried
forward into the critical period of the 1780s, unless there was
specific evidence to the contrary. In his controversial work on
war powers, for example, John Yoo tended to fix the meaning of

14.

33. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 3, at 167–68, 248–49, 391, 394–98, 410–

34. Cf. Stephen M. Griffin, The Executive Power, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 343, 350 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A.
Graber, & Sanford Levinson eds., 2015).
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executive power (including the phrase “declare war”) by using
35
evidence from mid-eighteenth century England. He then
constructed his entire argument around the assumption that
this meaning changed not at all through the Revolutionary
War, the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, the critical
period of the 1780s, and the writing and ratification of the
36
Constitution. This modus operandi suggests that the method
of original public meaning depends on the existence of a stable
baseline of constitutional meanings prior to the Philadelphia
Convention. But why should this pose a problem?
Because the leading historical scholarship on the formation
of the Constitution, including the work of Bernard Bailyn,
Gordon Wood, Jack Rakove and many other historians, showed
that the critical period destabilized the baseline for
understanding the words and phrases in the Constitution,
including such critically important doctrines such as federalism
and separation of powers. Influenced strongly by Scalia’s
advocacy of the original public meaning approach, executive
power
scholars
developed
their
own
custom-built
historiography without proper consideration of the prior
37
seminal work of these historians. Rakove’s criticism of Scalia’s
key original meaning opinion in the Second Amendment case of
38
District of Columbia v. Heller serves well as a summary of the
historians’ critique:
Scalia’s version of originalism/textualism, as applied in this opinion,
seems oblivious to the most important findings that historians from
Edmund Morgan (writing on the Stamp Act) on through [Bernard]
Bailyn, [Gordon S.] Wood, myself and others have argued over the
last half-century: that this was a deeply creative era in
constitutionalism and political thought, and the idea that static
definitions will capture the dynamism of what was going on cannot
39
possibly be true.
35. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).
36. For a relevant critique of Yoo’s work, see Stephen M. Griffin, LONG
WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 41–45 (2013).
37. On the other hand, some legal academics took historians seriously.
See, e.g., Martin Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
38. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Scalia’s opinion is arguably built on a number of
preemptive moves. Most notably, he contends that the prefatory clause in the
Second Amendment concerning “a well regulated militia” does not “limit or
expand the scope” of the operative clause granting the right “to keep and bear
arms.” Id. at 578.
39. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 391 (quoting Jack Rakove, Thoughts on
Heller from a “Real Historian,” BALKANIZATION (June 27, 2008), http://

2016]

AFFIRMATIVE OR NEGATIVE?

61

Eventually Scalia took notice of the historians’ critique and
the possible danger of “law-office” history, but his response was
40
disappointing. He appealed to the stability of word meanings
since the eighteenth century and noted that the Supreme Court
has the help of “legions of academic legal historians populating
41
law and history faculties at our leading universities.” The
problem of “law-office” history, however, has to do with the
selective use of historical evidence by lawyers and judges,
motivated by the understandable pressing need to resolve
42
specific cases.
One possible option that tends to be
shortchanged by the adversarial process is that the historical
evidence is simply insufficient to resolve the question at issue.
Moreover, the general problem Scalia never addressed is the
lack of familiarity of lawyers and judges with the historical
context of the founding period, a context which generations of
historians have labored with much success to establish.
Surprisingly, in a lecture at Harvard in the wake of Heller,
Scalia contended that given that historians of the founding
period were in disagreement, lawyers with their training in
interpreting texts were well qualified to adjudicate among
43
them! This was perhaps Scalia’s most audacious use of
preemptive argument—positing that the legal method trumps
history.
Scalia’s second preemptive move to define the debate in
terms of a stark opposition between originalism and
nonoriginalism also impeded the progress of constitutional
44
theory. Throughout his writings, Scalia seemed notably
alienated from the real character of the American
constitutional tradition. At least from the time of the Marshall
Court, that tradition has exhibited a variety of methods of
45
interpretation, all ably attested to by legal historians. The
balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/thoughts-on-heller-from-real-historian.html.
40. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 399–402.
41. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 401 (citation omitted).
42. Cf. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM
THEORY TO POLITICS 164–69 (1996).
43. See MURPHY, supra note 3, at 397, 410–14.
44. I recognize that some scholars believe the term “nonoriginalism” is
unobjectionable as it simply means the rejection of originalism. But I think
allowing originalists (following Justice Scalia) to define the argumentative
terrain in this way grants them too much, as it in effect concedes that
“nonoriginalism” is nontraditional and suggests that it offers no guidance as to
how to interpret the Constitution.
45. See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 42, at 143–52.
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true alternative to Scalia’s view is in fact the traditional or
conventionalist view, grounded in Marshall’s common law
approach to constitutional interpretation, that the sources of
law familiar to Americans during the founding era and early
republic were all legitimate starting points for methods of
46
constitutional interpretation.
Pretty clearly, what Scalia really had in mind by
“nonoriginalism” was any theory capable of justifying
substantive due process, a doctrine he thought wholly
47
mistaken. Even if this specific point is conceded, however,
there is much legitimate constitutional interpretation,
advanced throughout the entirety of American constitutional
history, that has nothing to do with Scalia’s narrow take on
how to use historical evidence—that is, the theory of original
public meaning. Certainly defining “nonoriginalism” as the
alternative made it easier for Scalia to avoid a meaningful
engagement with the reasoning that led Supreme Court
Justices and scholars to the perspective on constitutional
change usually called the “living Constitution.”
Two considerations that Scalia ignored are especially
relevant. First, there is the inherent difficulty of advancing
constitutional amendments over the supermajoritarian barriers
imposed by Article V. This difficulty is compounded by what I
have described as the “reverence feedback effect,” something
well documented historically, which makes it politically
difficult to advance even reasonable amendment proposals.
Because the Constitution is not simply a law but a revered
object of political identity, such proposals tend to be treated not
only as critiques of a respected document, but as proclamations
48
that America as a whole is on the wrong track. Americans
resist these ideas. Living constitutionalists tend to believe that
with the decline of interest in making significant amendments,
there has been a corresponding pragmatic imperative for the
Supreme Court, working with the political branches, to fill the
gap. Living constitutionalists do not understand this to be a
radical position because of the second consideration: our
circumstances and values have in some instances changed so
dramatically over the centuries that the framers’ perspective
can be relevant only on a highly selective basis.
46. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); DAVID A.
STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
47. Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 1, at 39.
48. GRIFFIN, supra note 42, at 39.
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These considerations are well illustrated by Brown and the
enormous legal and political effort required to dismantle
segregation. Originalists tend to treat Brown as a single case
about education (rather than about segregation as a whole)
49
which poses a potential problem for their point of view. Scalia
is no exception in this respect, asserting that the meaning of
“equal protection” is sufficiently broad “to prohibit all laws
designed to assert the separateness and superiority of the
50
white race, even those that purport to treat the races equally.”
It’s hard to know what to make of this because Scalia did not
purport to do the sort of historical research into the original
public meaning of “equal protection” that was necessary. But if
this is the original meaning of equal protection, then we have
arrived at something close to what “nonoriginalists” or living
constitutionalists have always contended—that given changed
circumstances, it is justifiable to read capacious phrases like
“equal protection” in an aspirational spirit. That is ultimately
what the Supreme Court did in Brown and the cases that
flowed from it. As Jack Balkin argues in his seminal Living
Originalism, once Scalia made this move to emphasizing the
semantic meaning of abstract phrases such as “equal
protection,” the line between originalism and nonoriginalism
51
became hair thin.
Scalia’s response to Brown was deficient in another way.
The point living constitutionalists are making with Brown is
not solely that originalism might not be able to justify
important precedents that no one is interested in overturning.
Brown and the Amazonian river of equal protection law that
flows from it show that Scalia’s theory of legal legitimacy is
flawed. From Scalia’s perspective, what should matter is that
the opinion in Brown was not based properly on an inquiry into
the original meaning of equal protection, something that
presumably made it illegitimate when it was decided. If,
however, the legal community treated Brown and its
considerable progeny as not only legitimate, but with respect as
involving a new understanding of what the Fourteenth
Amendment meant and thus the cornerstone of a new era of
judicial review (the “rights revolution”), then this showed that
49. For an up-to-date discussion of the debate between originalists and
nonoriginalists on Brown, see Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125
HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2027–30 (2012).
50. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 88.
51. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 100–08 (2011).
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Scalia’s originalism is missing something important about how
legitimate constitutional change occurs within American
history.
At least since Brown, the Fourteenth Amendment is
probably most responsible for inspiring the notion of the living
Constitution. Scalia made things considerably easier on himself
by rejecting the substantive due process doctrine and simply
positing that the original meaning of equal protection does not
have bad consequences in the present. If Scalia had curbed his
penchant for using preemptive arguments for a moment, he
might have perceived that the scholars he described as
“nonoriginalist” came up with that perspective as a
consequence of wrestling with the knotty interpretive problems
posed by the clauses he was so assiduously avoiding.
Nonetheless, in terms of the debate over constitutional
interpretation, Scalia’s rhetorical strategy was a success. Scalia
is certainly treated as if he made a major contribution to
constitutional theory, even though it is striking how little he
actually had to say about the interpretive problems posed by
the Fourteenth Amendment—the problems that caused the
contemporary debate in the first place.
To return to the terms of college debate, how should we
evaluate Justice Scalia—better on the Affirmative side or the
Negative? Some debaters are known for having an affinity for
one side over the other. On the affirmative side, there is no
question that Justice Scalia was successful in promoting
originalism as original public meaning and, as a consequence,
sparking new interest among legal academics into launching
more rigorous inquiries into the historical meaning of the
Constitution. Yet the evidence that Justice Scalia was more
comfortable on the negative is far more striking and
persuasive. Scalia often seemed fairly gloomy about the course
52
of constitutional law as he saw it in his years on the Court.
But it is noteworthy that even early on, Scalia saw the role of
the Constitution and the Court in mostly negative terms.
Rather than understanding the Constitution as an ongoing
framework for government, Scalia tended to emphasize the
purpose of the Bill of Rights in preventing ideas of “progress”
from restricting rights and saw American society as just as

52. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 221, 232, 241–42, 256.
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likely to “rot” over time as to advance toward a more
54
promising future.
It is a shame that Scalia tended to wrap his version of
originalism around the rule of law as if the two were identical.
When the Supreme Court rejected relying on any doctrinally
plausible version of originalism in Brown, it guaranteed the
end of segregation and thus a corresponding massive increase
in the rule of law for African Americans. Contrary to Scalia’s
description of the civil rights decisions as relying on notions of
55
a “judicial aristocracy,” the Supreme Court worked to assist a
democratic social movement and, together with the political
branches, achieved one of the greatest constitutional triumphs
in American history, a Second Reconstruction. From Scalia’s
perspective, however, was this a signal legal and constitutional
achievement or an overdue reform motivated ultimately by
political considerations? Given that Scalia seemed naturally
inclined to be negative on American constitutional history, it
remains unfortunately difficult to answer this question.

53. Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 1, at 41.
54. Scalia’s view on this point is criticized effectively in CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 36–39 (2001).
55. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 88.

